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Abstract 
Supply chain security is a hot topic for research, but 
the specific phrase "supply chain security" has different 
definitions for different groups. This paper presents a brief 
taxonomy for both the terms supply chain and security, and 
then explores a basic framework to help describe areas of 
research in supply chain security. Security is broken down 
into confidentiality, integrity, and availability; supply 
chain is detailed as the networks, processes, and elements. 
By creating a method for describing the research, we can 
begin to create a framework of the research in supply 
chain security. This framework allows us to see where 
prior work has been done and allows us to focus on less-
explored areas. It also allows us to compare and translate 
the supply chain research being performed in one field 
(electronics), to other fields (e.g. food production, clothing 
manufacturing). 
1. Introduction  
"Supply chain security" is a phrase with many 
meanings in a variety of fields. For those in the 
logistics world, it means, "can I get what I need when 
I need it" [1]. For a business person, it may mean, 
"can I ensure the security of the proprietary 
information about my product" [2]. A software 
designer must be interested in all the different people 
who have submitted code to the project, and a 
hardware vendor cares about who manufactured what 
components and how. In the modern marketplace, 
supply chain security may also include ensuring that 
the workforce and products involved with the 
creation of a product is ethically sourced [3, 4].   Prior 
work has also focused on ensuring physical supply 
chain security, especially focused on terrorism-driven 
challenges [5]. 
This wealth of meaning has translated into two 
different problems, both based on the difficulty of 
communicating outside of a given field. The first 
problem is that there are holes in the research, areas 
of interest that have not yet been explored because 
researchers just don't know they are holes. The other 
problem is unnecessarily repeated research due to 
different focus areas use a variety of different words 
to describe the same concepts. 
To remedy this, two things are needed: a 
taxonomy and a framework. The taxonomy grounds 
the conversation, facilitating communication between 
researchers from different backgrounds. A framework 
is needed to lay out the areas of research, to describe 
sections that have been explored and what requires 
more research. Until groups share a language, they 
cannot share research. Without a shared language, 
research is isolated. Without a common map or 
framework, research areas will be missed or 
unnecessarily repeated. The goal of this paper is to 
lay out a general map (framework) of the supply 
chain security world, sketching in rough borders and 
creating a basic shared language (taxonomy). 
The first section of this paper provides a 
framework that can be built upon to solve these 
problems. The second section of this paper lays out a 
high-level taxonomy, describing both the terms 
"security" and "supply chain" at a level which will be 
applicable from integrated circuit manufacturers to 
hot-dog producers. The third section builds upon this 
and lays out a basic framework for research, while the 
fourth section presents case studies where the 
techniques of one field have been migrated into 
another field. We conclude in the fifth section with a 
discussion of future work needed to develop the 
framework into an actionable resource.  
2. Prior Work 
Prior work in supply chain management has 
largely focused on access, such as just-in-time 
manufacturing, and the necessary modeling to ensure 
that access [6, 7, 8].  Modeling a network is a critical 
area that is well suited to cross the boundaries of 
different fields, but is not broad enough to allow for 
the discussion on integrity and confidentiality.  In 
this paper, we have drawn from these sources to 
build a definition for the network of a supply chain. 
Supply chain security has been of great interest 
to the governments and militaries of various 
countries [9, 10], with a focus on ensuring that the 
products received are not fake/counterfeit or 
maliciously tampered with.  From the language laid 
out in these procurement and regulatory guidance, 
we were able to draw a basis for the definition of 
integrity.    
Most of our work on supply chain 
confidentiality has been drawn from prior work on 
supply chain privacy; most organizations wish to 
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reduce public information about their supply chain. 
[11]  However, there has been an increase in the 
research performed on methods for safely and 
securely communicating information about a supply 
chain, including both vertical exchanges [12] and 
horizontally [13].   
3. Taxonomy 
As described in the introduction, both "security" 
and "supply chain" have a range of different 
meanings in different applications. This taxonomy 
will isolate and fix certain meanings, as they will be 
needed for the later framework.  
3.1. Security 
The term "security" has been defined as a 
combination of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability for the information and cyber realms. 
This definition has been well explored and accepted; 
as such, it is used as the base for the supply chain 
security definition.   
Confidentiality  
One of the main historical tenants of security has 
been confidentiality. Troop movements, the details of 
a secret sauce formula, and news of a possible merger 
with another company all require confidentiality. 
Confidentiality is defined by Bishop [14] as not 
allowing unauthorized users to access information or 
objects. For the purpose of this framework, 
confidentiality is keeping information about the 
supply chain (e.g. intellectual property, contracts, 
and shipping plans) limited to authorized users. 
Integrity  
Information that has integrity is complete, without 
fault, and correctly functioning. In the supply chain, 
this translates to integrity being the ability to trust 
that the element that has just been moved or 
otherwise changed is still possessing of the same level 
of integrity as it had prior to the change. [15]  
For example, if a pound of ground beef with high 
integrity goes through an untrusted process, the 
output has low integrity (having possibly experienced 
uncertain and or unsafe additives/treatments). The 
integrity of the overall supply chain is dependent 
upon the correctness of the network. Integrity asks the 
questions: Did the parts go where, and only where, 
they are supposed to? Did they get routed through 
some untrusted third party? Was it the best route 
possible?  
Availability  
To be useful, an object must be accessible when 
and where it is wanted, in the form it is needed. A 
breakdown in availability means a stoppage in the 
movement of the supply chain. Where confidentiality 
explores denying unauthorized users access, 
availability seeks to ensure that authorized users have 
access. [16] Availability in the supply chain requires 
that all of the machinery, trucks, people, products, 
electricity and so on are available when and where 
needed.  
Availability is not a binary measurement. An 
element will rarely be completely cut off with no 
availability. Instead, an element may have reduced 
availability due to higher cost or transportation 
interruptions.  
3.2. Supply Chain 
Describing a supply chain as "a network in which 
processes act upon elements" divides the supply chain 
into the objects that we are acting upon (the 
elements), the actions performed on those elements 
(the processes), and the physical structure (the 
network) needed to perform those actions. We can 
evaluation a portion of the supply chain by looking 
back from a specific output element. Graphically, we 
can describe a supply chain as shown in Fig. 1. A 
sample supply chain is presented in Fig. 2.  
Elements 
An element is an item (e.g. a hot dog, an 
integrated circuit (IC), an iPad, a book, etc.). An 
element is both the output of the supply chain and the 
input. Each element can be combined with other 
elements to create a higher level element. For 
example, an IC may be created through the supply 
chain and then combined with other elements like an 
LCD screen, software, and a network control board to 
create a SCADA control system. That SCADA 
control system may then be joined with elements such 
as a nuclear reactor and cooling system to create a 
nuclear power plant.  
This idea of elements and sub-elements allows us 
to look at both the end element as it is delivered and 
any of the input elements at any step of the supply 
chain. A flexible level of granularity is necessary to 
allow for the application of this term to many 
production fields, or to allow the exploration of the 
security metrics at different stages in the supply 
chain.  
Processes  
The processes are actions that transform elements 
into higher level elements. These actions may include 
terms like "mix" (in baking instructions) and "solder" 
(in construction of a printed circuit board), and more 
temporal terms like "rest", or spatial terms including 
"transport" and "lift". A process may result in the 
Figure 1.  Simple Supply Chain 
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joining of two or more elements into a higher level 
element, or it may describe the transformation of a 
single element into another single element that is 
further along the supply chain. It can also include the 
creation of a element, through a transfer from the 
human mind to a physical product; this can be seen in 
the creation of software, literature, or art.  
A process can be performed via a machine, an 
individual's direct or indirect actions, or by basic 
physical functions such as gravity. The process needs 
the instantiation of the network to act upon the 
elements. 
Network  
The network are the elements and the 
interconnection of those elements that perform 
processes on other elements. Everything from roads 
and factories to trucks and ink pens and how they 
work together makes up the network. A network is 
easy to visualize when considering a final element. 
Take a piece of paper and work backwards to look at 
every physical item that has touched that piece of 
paper or any of its input elements, as in the top of Fig. 
2. The piece of paper was changed from pulp to paper 
in a given factory, and that given factory has specific 
tools that process the pulp. That factory and all of the 
equipment it contains is part of the paper's supply 
chain. Moving further back is the sawmill that made 
the pulp and the forest that provided the tree. We also 
must include any of the roads and vehicles that were 
used to move any of these input elements. 
Figure 2. Intermediate Supply Chain 
Figure 3.  Supply Chain with Single Depth Line 
4507
 3.3. The Challenge of Including People 
Throughout the entire supply chain people are 
needed to push the button to make the process start, to 
use the network to move elements, to provide the 
intelligence to apply processes in a given order, and 
to lay out the network in the best way. Is a human a 
process or an network object? For the purpose of this 
framework if the human body is used (lifting, 
moving), it is part of the network. If the human mind 
is involved (following instructions, choosing a path), 
it is part of the processes.  
3.4. Depth 
The "full depth" of a given supply chain is a very 
complex thing. Many supply chains may contribute to 
the chain of leading to the final element of interest, 
creating a massive depth to the supply chain analysis. 
We must ask, can the tools that make the tools that 
make perform the processes be trusted? What of the 
tools that make the tools that make the tools? How far 
down the rabbit hole must we go to ensure full, 100% 
security of the supply chain for a piece of paper? This 
problem is a rapidly expanding one, as can be seen in 
Figure 3, and at some point we must trust the supply 
chain. 
The authors of this paper do not have the answer, 
and doubt that a definitive answer will be provided in 
the near future, to a method for ensuring the full 
depth the supply chain is secure. This problem is too 
complex to simply map, much less solve. Therefore, 
we suggest focusing on a limited subset of critical 
input elements and processes. By considering the 
important properties of your output product, you can 
provide selectively greater depth for processes and 
objects that influence those properties. The 
complexity of the supply chain can become 
unmanageable unless limited to reasonable depth and 
scope. 
4. Research Framework 
The previous section described two groups of 
terms - those that describe security and those that 
describe the supply chain. Another way to look at this 
is having a description of what will happen and a 
description of the subject of those actions. Integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability may exist in any of 
the network, processes, and elements. This section 
will provide a framework that describes this 
combination of needs and areas.  
The table in Figure 4 gives a visual overview of 
this idea with brief examples included. This table 
serves to give a high-level overview of the framework 
but is not highly comprehensive. A fully-formed 
framework would require a much larger document 
and a specific field or element's supply chain. Since 
this is not useful for exploring how to apply this 
framework to a wide array of areas and does not 
contribute towards sharing overall security principles 
between fields, this discussion will remain in broad 
terms.  
It should be noted that while each of these areas 
of security and supply chain components are 
generally described as standalone concepts - each 
with its own areas of concern and research, there are 
actually a myriad of interconnects. To ease the 
introduction of this concept these interconnects are 
glossed over here. Later work(s) will be dedicated to 
exploring them. 
Figure 4.  Research Framework for Supply Chain Security 
Confidentiality Information about 
suppliers, capabilities, or 
routes are kept 
confidential. 
The exact process steps or 
types are kept confidential. 
Intellectual property about 
the element is kept 
confidential 
Integrity The layout of the objects in 
the network is correct and 
efficient 
The workers performing 
the processes are trained 
properly and correct 
instructions are available. 
The element is what it 
claims to be (e.g., not 
counterfeit). 
Availability The physical structure of 
the network is not 
disrupted, slowed, or made 
unavailable. 
The workers and the 
equipment needed to 
perform the processes are 
available. 
As an input to either a new 
supply chain or to a 
retailer, the element is 
available when and where 
needed. 
 
N twork Process Element 
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4.1. Network 
Confidentiality 
When competing for limited resources, a 
company may wish to keep its suppliers secret. The 
choice of suppliers may reveal information to a 
competitor or attacker. The organization of objects in 
the network within a single facility may reveal where 
elements may be stolen or replaced with counterfeits. 
Either the objects that make up the supply chain or 
their specific layouts may need to remain confidential 
for an organization to remain competitive or 
trustworthy. 
Recently, this could be seen in the friction 
between Samsung and Apple, as they fought over 
LCD screens made by Sharp. Because Sharp has 
limited resources, the confidentiality breach that 
allowed Samsung to learn of Apple's dependence on 
the supplier led to an availability problem with 
Samsung attempting to purchase all of the available 
screens. New competitors may also try to take 
advantage of who exactly is supplying what to their 
competitors to find sources of their own. [17, 18] 
Integrity  
The integrity of the network is critical for chain of 
custody concerns. If the network is incorrect or 
nondeterministic, it cannot be trusted that the 
processes have been performed correctly and the 
elements are what they should be.  A network with 
high determinism is also efficient, providing a correct 
layout of objects without delays and deviations. 
When considering the integrity of the network, both 
the objects (the machines, trucks, and roads) and the 
layout of those objects are equally important.  
Unexpected deviations in the network, such as the 
re-routing of an airplane carrying freight to an 
untrusted nation, is a violation of the integrity of the 
network. If unknown or uncertain processes have 
been applied at the locations along the network that 
the element must pass, the network cannot claim it 
has integrity. In this way, the integrity of the network 
affects the integrity of the whole supply chain.  
Availability  
The availability of the network is easily described 
as anything that disrupts the physical structure of the 
supply chain is a failure of availability. This 
disruption may be complete, totally denying the 
supply chain use of a piece of machinery or a road, or 
partial, with only a delay to the accessibility of the 
object. This delay is a concern for any organization 
because it can decrease supply and drive up prices, 
hurting the bottom line.  
In 2011, the Great Tohoku Earthquake and 
Tsunami shut down much of the automotive 
production in Japan and nearby countries. As a result 
of this lapse in availability, Japanese automakers 
suffered a loss in market share and users of these 
vehicles experienced an increase in repair costs. On 
the other end of the supply chain, the workers who 
provide the brain-power behind the processes were 
also affected by a decrease in wages due to plant 
shutdowns. [19] 
 
4.2. Processes 
Due to its data-based nature, process security 
comes much closer to traditional information 
security than the security of the elements or network. 
While it is possible to affect the integrity of a 
process, keeping the details of the process 
confidential is a more common concern.  
Confidentiality 
The methods used to perform an action are often 
as valuable as the output of that action. The exact 
process steps need to be kept confidential to allow the 
organization to maintain its competitive edge. To 
provide physical security, the organization may need 
to keep information about the people performing the 
processes confidential. 
In traditional Japanese sword-smithing, the exact 
steps, temperatures, and folding techniques used to 
create a masterwork samurai edged weapon, such as a 
katana or naginata, were considered both sacred and 
highly confidential. [20] The weapon itself is of great 
value, but the skill of the smith and the process he 
followed to create the weapon is of much greater 
value. The confidentiality of the information the 
smith imparted to his apprentices was of the utmost 
importance. 
Integrity 
The integrity of the processes is maintained 
through mechanisms such as correctly training 
workers or appropriately calibrating the machines 
used to perform the process. A process without 
integrity will not perform the appropriate action upon 
the element Sometimes this is loss of integrity is 
immediately recognized, but often it may be that the 
alteration, especially if malicious, will not be 
instantly detected.  
While software is not often considered in a 
traditional supply chain mindset, it is still an element 
which has processes operating on it.  In the early 
2000's, the integrity of Microsoft's operating system 
code was called into question. In response, 
Microsoft's upper management famously decreed a 
halt to all work for two weeks in order to provide 
mandatory security training. [21] In this way, they 
were able to increase the integrity of their output 
element, the software, through an increase in the 
integrity of the processes through which they created 
the software. 
Availability 
To perform some processes, there must be 
workers and electricity available, as well as the 
instructions or knowledge for those workers to carry 
out the process. Without the availability of the 
processes, the network changes from a very dynamic 
system into a static, largely useless set of objects. The 
elements can no longer move or change and are stuck 
where they currently reside. 
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The lack of workers is a serious problem for 
leaders in China, who are beginning to feel the effects 
of the one-child policy. [22] Without the workers to 
perform basic tasks in factories, it may soon be 
impossible for Chinese-based companies to provide 
the extremely cheap products for which they have 
been known for the last decade. This lack of 
availability of people to perform processes may have 
worldwide impacts, shifting manufacturing to other 
realms and increasing wages in China. 
4.3. Elements 
Confidentiality 
The intellectual property surrounding many 
elements is often critical to an organization and 
keeping the exact understanding of how an element 
works out of unauthorized hands is of high priority. 
This can include the need to keep an element 
confidential to prevent reverse engineering or to 
provide confidentiality for the data contained in an 
element. [23] 
In the military world, the need for confidentiality 
of the design of elements, such as airplanes, goes to a 
new level. To ensure that these elements did not find 
themselves in unfriendly hands, the military in WWII 
designed auto-destruct features to destroy any sub-
element that required complete confidentiality. This 
could be seen in the auto-destruct designed into the 
Norden bomb-sights. This ensured the confidentiality 
of the design, should it fall into enemy hands. [24] 
Integrity 
The integrity of an element is critical, both for an 
element that is an end-item (a computer or a pizza) 
and for an element that will be combined with other 
elements to make a more complex element. End-item 
elements are directly used by individuals and as such 
are subject to stringent controls on allowable 
chemicals, labeling, and other integrity-based 
controls. A lack of integrity in a sub-element may 
affect the integrity of the super-element. Without 
understanding the integrity of sub-elements, the 
integrity of the super-element cannot be asserted.  
Counterfeit handbags, Trojan Horses in software, 
and improperly labeled fish are all breakdowns in the 
mechanisms that should protect the integrity of the 
element. While counterfeit handbags have a direct 
effect on the profitability of a company, other 
counterfeits have recently been seen coming into the 
market that are much more serious; a recent IEEE 
magazine article highlighted the practice of re-using 
old integrated circuits or other elements that may be 
used in critical systems. [25] 
Availability 
Without the elements, a network has no purpose 
and the processes have nothing to act upon. As such, 
the availability of the elements is critical for the 
correct movement of the entire supply chain. The 
sub-elements must be available when and where 
needed to create higher-level elements, and output 
elements must be available when and where people 
need them. A high level of availability ensures that 
the supply chain moves along; where as a low level of 
availability may cause stoppages or slowdowns 
throughout the entire depth and breadth of the supply 
chain. 
Ensuring the availability of elements has been a 
major concern for just-in-time manufacturing. A great 
deal of work has been performed in this area by a 
range of researchers [26, 27, 28] to ensure that the 
availability of elements is supported. This area is of 
concern to both industry partners with a bottom line 
to consider, as well as governmental organizations, 
such as the military or Department of Energy, who 
may need specific and hard to acquire minerals or 
basic elements (such as uranium, magnesium or 
tungsten).  
4.4. Tradeoffs and Supports 
There are tradeoffs between the goals in supply 
chain security. For example, having an element be 
available immediately might decrease the amount of 
time to ensure the integrity of the element. However, 
there can also be places where the goals support each 
other. For example, high confidentiality of the steps 
of a process may ensure that the output element has 
higher integrity. The availability of an element will 
support the availability of the network, and the 
integrity of the network will help to ensure the 
integrity of the elements. 
5. Case Studies 
Adaptation of an existing paradigm to a novel 
field is nothing new. New regulatory rules are often 
grounded to some level of fidelity in existing 
regulation. There are advantages and disadvantages to 
this, but it is often a matter of expediency or 
efficiency. While it not always the intent, the lessons 
learned in applying a regulatory framework to a new 
field, and the ability to translate the outcomes in the 
new field back to the parent field, may outweigh the 
disadvantages by gaining novel insight on the 
established field and seeing the new subject from the 
perspective forced by fitting it to the existing 
framework. By creating this framework and 
taxonomy, the authors hope to encourage the sharing 
and re-evaluation of specific supply chains.  
5.1. Adaptation of Maritime Precedence 
Rules to Aviation 
In the early 20th century, the field of aviation 
began growing to a size and at a rate that necessitated 
navigational guidelines. It cannot be proven, but the 
aviation etiquette adopted by early aviators suggests 
that the rules of maritime navigation were adapted 
naturally and then codified into law. Even if this is 
not the case, if aviation were to spring fully formed 
into the modern world without the benefit of history, 
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it would be reasonable to base aviation regulation in 
maritime navigation norms.  
In many ways, this adaptation of the basic rules 
was beneficial. The green light on the right side, red 
on the left, maritime lighting standard works equally 
well on aircraft and this standard is now being 
adapted to work on the Cygnus spacecraft. [29] 
Similarly, rules on overtaking, approaching head-on, 
and converging in FAA regulations [30], taken from 
the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea [31], are highly applicable. 
However, some modifications are needed when 
adapting the maritime to the aviation. For example, 
[30] cover several situations involving fishing 
vessels; it is unlikely that many aircraft will hover in 
a single location for hours at a time, negating the need 
for such a rule.  
5.2. Adaptation of the Toxicology 
Framework to Nanotechnology 
Nanoparticles are an example of a technology 
whose products became commonplace so rapidly that 
there was no time to develop a completely new 
regulatory regime. Currently most nanoparticles are 
regulated by toxicological rules as chemicals [32]. 
Toxicological assays and regulatory rules were 
mainly developed for drug safety testing decades ago 
and have found further use regulating pesticides, 
chemicals, cosmetics and foodstuffs. It was logically 
extended to nanotoxicology regulations, especially 
when the nano-product falls into one of these 
categories. There is strong evidence however, that 
nanoparticles cannot be assumed to have the same 
properties as their parent compounds. Nano-
preparations of compounds have been shown to have 
significantly different kinetics of adsorption, 
dispersion, metabolism, and excretion [33] , and 
novel biological interactions emergent from 
nanoparticle properties that have toxic effect 
pathways not shown by the parent compound. [34] 
Silver and Gold, elements normally considered to 
have minimal reactivity, have demonstrated 
nanoparticle size and shape dependent effects on 
cellular uptake and anti-microbial activity. [35, 36] 
Thus, the potential toxic effects or effective dose of 
nanoparticles cannot be extrapolated from knowledge 
of their chemical composition.  
Unfortunately, there are documented cases of 
nanotoxicology reinventing safety testing for 
cytotoxicity and mutagenicity without drawing from 
the decades of development and validation of these 
assays for chemicals used in cosmetics. [33, 36] 
There is strong evidence that modern assays 
developed and optimized for nanotoxicology will be 
adaptable to the benefit of toxicology and the other 
fields for which classical toxicology has become 
crucial. [37, 38, 39, 40]  The specific properties of 
nanoparticles illustrate the disadvantage of using 
regulation and protocols born of another field. The 
rapid construction of a useful framework that has 
been adapted to suit the new field demonstrates the 
advantages of this approach. Further, this common 
framework appears to be facilitating technological 
transfer between fields.  
6. Future Paths 
This paper laid out a general map of the supply 
chain security world, sketching in rough borders and 
creating a basic shared language. This work needs to 
be expanded upon in a variety of directions. 
Each field, be it electronic manufacturing, meat 
processing, or jewelry crafting, needs to customize 
this framework to better fit that specific world. The 
selected terminology was left broad to accommodate 
for this and to facilitate the sharing across fields, but 
there needs to be depth into the field to support the 
breadth.  
The current framework is currently limited by the 
definition of security as confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. Future research should be directed to 
developing a more specific set of definitions for 
security that grows deeper into subsets of CIA. 
Authorization, non-repudiation, privacy, and fault-
tolerance need to be considered as well.  
Feedback from more researchers on this 
framework and the applicability to their field is 
critical. The creators of this framework come from 
computer science and biology backgrounds; more 
business and manufacturing people are needed to 
explore the framework and taxonomy and develop a 
more well-rounded system. 
Finally, more research is needed to fill in the 
holes of the framework in each specific field. The 
original purpose of this framework was to detail 
where research had been performed and where more 
focus was needed. For example, in the integrated 
circuit world, more research is needed into evaluating 
the integrity of an element. Each field will likely have 
areas that are needful of more attention.  
Further crossing research between fields is also 
needed. It may be that the research done on 
availability of the processes for the furniture building 
field can be modified and applied to the availability 
of the processes for petroleum processing. Currently, 
there is much reinventing of the wheel in different 
fields and research is needed to help the research 
cross fields.  
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, a high-level taxonomy was 
presented to facilitate research in supply chain 
security. A basic map of the research world in supply 
chain security was laid out and filled in, and case 
studies presented to give examples of situations 
where the framework for one realm has been applied 
to another successfully. By combining the 
cyber/information security definition with a novel 
description of the supply chain, our goal has been 
accomplished. The next step will be to move forward 
towards refining this framework and taxonomy.  
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